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Child victim of the Holodomor

Child victim of the Holodomor

The Ukrainian famine (1932–1933), or Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомор) (literally in Ukrainian, “death by hunger”), was one of the largest national catastrophes in the modern history of the Ukrainian nation. Modern scholarly estimates of the direct loss of human life due to the famine range between 2.6 million [1][2] and 3-3.5 million[3] although much higher numbers are sometimes published in the media and cited in political debates.

The term Holodomor is applied only to the famine that took place in the territories of the Ukrainian SSR[4] during the wider famine that affected other regions of the USSR. The term Holodomor is sometimes applied to the famine that occurred at the same time in other areas populated by ethnic Ukrainians outside of Soviet Ukraine.

The reasons of the famine are the subject of intense scholarly and political debate. Some historians claim the famine was purposely engineered by the Soviet authorities to attack Ukrainian nationalism, while others view it as an unintended consequence of the economic problems associated with radical economic changes implemented during Soviet industrialization.[5] It is sometimes argued that natural causes may have been the primary reason for the disaster.

There is no international consensus among scholars or politicians on whether the Soviet policies that caused the famine fall under the legal definition of genocide.[6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15] However, as of March 2008, the parliament of Ukraine and the governments of several countries have recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide.[16]



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The word comes from the Ukrainian words holod, ‘hunger’, and mor, ‘plague’,[17] possibly from the expression moryty holodom, ‘to inflict death by hunger’. The Ukrainian verb “moryty” (морити) means “to poison somebody, drive to exhaustion or to torment somebody”. The perfect form of the verb “moryty” is “zamoryty” — “kill or drive to death by hunger, exhausting work”. The neologism “Holodomor” is given in the modern, two-volume dictionary of the Ukrainian language as “artificial hunger, organised in vast scale by the criminal regime against the country’s population”[18] Sometimes the expression is translated into English as “murder by hunger.”[19]

Causes and outcomes

Map of the Ukrainian SSR in 1932-1933 (7 Oblasts and Moldavian ASSR) administrative borders given in light gray.

Map of the Ukrainian SSR in 1932-1933 (7 Oblasts and Moldavian ASSR) administrative borders given in light gray.

While complex, it is possible to group the causes of the Holodomor. They have to be understood in the larger context of the social revolution ‘from above’ that took place in the Soviet Union at the time.[20]

Policy of collectivization

Cover of the Soviet magazine Kolhosnytsia Ukrayiny (

Cover of the Soviet magazine Kolhosnytsia Ukrayiny (“Collective Farm Woman of Ukraine”), December 1932

Approaches to changing from individual farming to a collective type of agricultural production had existed since 1917, but for various reasons (lack of agricultural equipment, agronomy resources, etc.) were not implemented widely until 1925, when there was a more intensive effort by the agricultural sector to increase the number of agricultural cooperatives and bolster the effectiveness of already existing sovkhozes. In late 1927, after the XV Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, then known as the All-Union Communist party (bolsheviks) or VKP(b), a significant impetus was given to the collectivization effort.

In 1927, a drought shortened the harvest in southern areas of the Ukrainian SSR and North Caucasus. In 1927–28 the winter tillage area was badly affected due to low snow levels. Despite seed aid from the State, many affected areas were not re-sown. The 1928 harvest was affected by drought in most of the grain producing areas of the Ukrainian SSR. Shortages in the harvest and difficulties with supply system invoked difficulties with food supply in urban areas and destabilized the food supply situation in the USSR in general. In order to alleviate the situation, a system of food rationing was implemented in the second quarter of 1928 in Odessa, later in Mariupol, Kherson, Kiev, Dniprelstan (Dnipropetrovsk), and Kharkiv. At the beginning of 1929 a similar system was implemented throughout the USSR. Despite the aid from the Ukrainian and the Central governments, many southern rural areas registered occurrences of malnutrition and in some cases hunger and starvation (the affected areas and thus the amount of required food aid was under-accounted by authorities). Due to the shortage of forage livestock, its numbers were also affected (see table below). Most of Kolkhozes and recently refurnished sovkhozes went through these years with few losses, and some were even able to provide assistance to peasants in the more affected areas (seed and grain for food).

Despite the intense state campaign, the collectivization, which was initially voluntary, was not popular amongst peasants: as of spring 1929, only 5.6% of Ukrainian peasant households and 3.8% of arable land was “collectivized”. In the spring of 1929, the methods employed by the specially empowered authority “UkrKolhozcenter” changed from a voluntary enrollment to an administrative one. By October 1st, 1929, a plan for the creation of kolkhozes was “outperformed” by 239%. As a result, 8.8% of arable land was “collectivized”.[22]

The next major step toward “all-over collectivization” took place after an article was published by Stalin in Pravda, in early November 1929.

While “summoned “ by November 10November 17, 1929 meeting of VKP(b) Central Committee “Twenty-Five Thousanders” only trained at special short courses, the main driving force of collectivization and dekulakization in Ukraine became a “poor peasants committee” (“komnezamy”) and local village councils (silrady) where komnezams members had a voting majority.

The USSR Kolhozcenter issued the December 10, 1929, decree on collectivisation of livestock within a 3-month period (draft animals 100%, cattle 100%, pigs 80%, sheep and goats 60%). This drove many peasants to slaughter their livestock. By January 1, 1930, the percentage of collectivized households almost doubled, to 16.4% of the total number of households.

Ukrainian SSR livestock (thousand head)
Year Total
Total Cattle Oxen Bulls Cows Pigs Sheep
and Goats
1927 5056.5 3900.1 8374.5 805.5 3852.1 4412.4 7956.3
1928 5486.9 4090.5 8604.8 895.3 32.8 3987.0 6962.9 8112.2
1929 5607.5 4198.8 7611.0 593.7 26.9 3873.0 4161.2 7030.8
1930 5308.2 3721.6 6274.1 254.8 49.6 3471.6 3171.8 4533.4
1931 4781.3 3593.7 6189.5 113.8 40.0 3377.0 3373.3 3364.8
1932 3658.9 5006.7 105.2 2739.5 2623.7 2109.5
1933 2604.8 4446.3 116.9 2407.2 2089.2 2004.7
1934 2546.9 2197.3 5277.5 156.5 46.7 2518.0 4236.7 2197.1

Despite the infamous January 5, 1930 decree, in which the deadline for the complete collectivization of the Ukrainian SSR was set for the period from the end of 1931 to the spring of 1932, the Ukrainian SSR authorities decided to accelerate the completion of the campaign by autumn of 1930. The high expectations of the plan were outperformed by local authorities even without the assistance of the 7500 “Twenty-Five Thousanders who had reached some areas only by mid-February [23] – so by March 70.9% of arable land and 62.8% of peasant households were suddenly collectivized. The “Dekulakization” plan was also “over-performed”. Almost 200,000 households (3.8% of total peasant households) were affected by the requisition of property, land, and houses. Some of the peasants were arrested and deported “northward”. Many arrested ‘kulaks‘ and “well-to-do” farmers resettled their families to the Urals and Central Asia, where they were often placed in others sectors of the economy, such as timber cutting.[21] The term ‘kulak’ was ultimately applied to anybody resisting collectivization as many of the so-called ‘kulaks’ were no more well-off than other peasants.

The fast-track to collectivization incited numerous peasant revolts in Ukraine and in other parts of the USSR. In response to the situation, the Soviet regime stepped back: the March 2, 1930, issue of “Pravda” published the Stalin’s article “Dizzy with successes”. Soon, numerous orders and decrees were issued banning the use of force and administrative methods. Some of “mistakenly dekulkized”, however not all, received back their property, and even some mistakenly deported (family of Red Parizans, and RKKA families as also some others) returned home but in very insignificant amounts – most remained where they had been deported ,- but without revoked rights. The collectivization process was rolled back by 1 May, but by that time 38.2% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 41.1% of arable land had been collectivized. By the end of August these numbers declined to 29.2% and 35.6% respectively.

A second “forced-voluntary” collectivization campaign was initiated in the winter–summer of 1931 with significant assistance of the so-called “tug-brigades” composed from kolkhoz udarniks. Many “kulaks” along with families were deported from the Ukrainian SSR.

According to declassified data, around 300,000 peasants in Ukrainian SSR out of a population of about 30 million were subject to these policies in 1930–31. Ukrainians composed 15% of the total 1.8 million ‘kulaks’ relocated Soviet-wide.[22] On July 20, 1931 – as a response to the numerous regional requests for additional numbers of kulak deportations Politburo of VKP (b) concluded that the “strategic task of the Party was almost accomplished. All farther deportations were recommended to conduct for individuals only.” [23]

This campaign also resulted a delay of sowing. As a result, cereal crops were heavily affected by the 1931 drought. During winter and spring of 1930–31, the Ukrainian agricultural authority “Narkomzem” Ukrainian SRR issued several reports about the significant decline of livestock and especially drought power caused by poor treatment, absence of forage, stables/farms and due the “kulaks sabotage”.

According to the First Five-Year Plan, Ukrainian agriculture was to switch from an exclusive orientation of grain to a more diverse output. This included not only a rise in Sugar beet cropping, but also other types of agricultural production were expected to be utilised by industry (with even cotton plants being established in 1931). This plan anticipated a decrease in grain acreage, in contrast to an increase of yield, area and of acreage for other crops. By July 1, 1931, 65.7% of Ukrainian SSR peasant households and 67.2% of arable land were reported as “collectivized”. Principal grain and sugar beet production areas, however, were collectivized to a greater extent — 80-90%. [24]

Decree of Central Committee of VKP(b) from August 2 1931 clarified the “all-over collectivization” term – in order to be considered complete the “all-over collectivization” does not have to reach “100%”, but not less then 68-70% of peasants households and not less then 75-80% of arable lands. According to the same decree “all-over collectivization” accomplished at Northern Caucasus (Kuban) – 88% of households and 92% of arable lands “collectivized”, Ukraine (South) – 85 and 94 percents respectively, Ukraine (Right Bank) – 69 and 80 percents respectively, and Moldavian ASRR (part of Ukrainian SRR) – 68 and 75 percent. [25]

As of the beginning of October 1931, the dual collectivization of 68.0% of peasant households, and 72.0% of arable land was complete.[26]

Ukrainian SRR arable land by usage 1913- 1934. Note the lowest ever grain seed area percentage in 1931 and 1932

Ukrainian SRR arable land by usage 1913- 1934. Note the lowest ever grain seed area percentage in 1931 and 1932

The plan of the state grain collection in the Ukrainian SSR adopted for 1931 turned out to be over-optimistic — 510 million poods (8.4 Tg). Drought, administrative distribution of the plan for kolkhozes together with the lack of relevant management generally destabilized the situation. Significant amounts of grain remained unharvested on kolkhoz and sovkhoz fields. Significant percentage were lost during processing and transportation, or spoiled at elevators (wet grain). Winter sowing areas were shortened by approximately 2 million hectares. Livestock in kolkhozes remained without forage, which was collected under grain procurement. A similar fate happened with respect to seeds and wages in kind for kolhoz members. Nevertheless, grain collection continued till May 1932 but reached only 90% of expected plan figures. As of the end of December 1931, the collection plan was accomplished by 79%. Many kolkhozes from December 1931 onwards suffered from lack of food, resulting in an increased number of deaths caused by malnutrition registered by OGPU in some areas (Moldavian SSR in a whole and several central rayons of Vinnytsya, Kiev and North-East rayons of Odessa oblasts [24] ) in winter-spring and the early summer months of 1932. By 1932 the sowing campaign of the Ukrainian SSR was obtained with minimal drought power – most of the remaining horses were incapable of working, while the number of available agricultural tractors was too small to fill the gap.

Article from a Soviet newspaper with the first version of a plan for grain collections in 1932 for kolkhozes and peasants - 5,831.3 thousand tons + sovkhozes 475,034 tons

Article from a Soviet newspaper with the first version of a plan for grain collections in 1932 for kolkhozes and peasants – 5,831.3 thousand tons + sovkhozes 475,034 tons

The Government of the Ukrainian SSR tried to remedy the situation from March with recourse to internal resources, but had little success – withdrawal of food from other Ukrainian regions depleted their own limited supplies. Starting in February 1932, administrative and territorial reform (oblast creation) also added mismanagement cast, – even Moscow had more details about the seed situation than the Ukrainian authorities. In May, in a desperate effort to change the situation, the central Soviet Government provided 7.1 million poods of grain for food for Ukraine and reverted no less than 700 agricultural tractors intended for other regions of USSR. By July, the total amount of aid provided from Central Soviet Authorities for food, sawing and forage for “agricultural sector” was numbered more than 17 million poods. Speculative prices on food in cooperative network (5-10 times more as compared with neighboring Soviet republics) invoked significant peasant “travel for bread”, while attempts to handle situation with speculation (quota on carried-on foods) had very limited success. On protection by Kosior, such provision was lifted by Stalin at the end of May 1932. July GPU reports for the first half of 1932, which spoke about the “difficulties with food” in 127 rayons (out of 484), acknowledge the fact the they did not have enough information for all rayons. Issued in May, the Decree of Sovnarkom on “Kolkhoz Trade” fostered rumors amongst peasants that collectivization was rolled-back again as it had been in spring 1930. The number of peasants who abandoned kolkhozes significantly increased.

Taking into account the situation in Ukraine, the central grain collection plan was lowered by 18.1%, compared to the 1931 plan. Kolkhozes were to harvest 4751.2 thousand tons, peasants were responsible for 1080.1 thousand tons. Sovkhozes were to submit 475,034 tons. In addition Ukrainian kolkhozes and sovkhozes were to return 132,750 tons of grain which had been provided in spring 1932 for aid. The grain collection plan for July 1932 was adopted to collect 19.5 million poods. However, the actual state of collection was disastrous, and by 31 July only 3 million poods (compared to 21 million in 1931) had been collected. As of July 20 harvested area was half of that in 1931. The sovhozes had only logged a mere 16% of the defined sawing area.

This disparity between agricultural goals, and actual production ability was only amplified later in the year. An expected 190 thousand tons of grain were to be exported, but by August 27, 1932, only 20 thousand tons were ready. The Ukrainian SSR met with difficulty in supply with planned amount of food a rationing system to supply urban areas with food. This system was major source for food delivery to cities while the alternatives, cooperative trade and black market trading, were too expensive, and under-supplied, to provide long-range assistance. By October 25, the plan for grain collection was lowered once again, from the quantity called for in the plan of August 22, 1932. Nevertheless, collection reached only 39% of the annually planned total.[27] A second lowering of goals deducted 70 million poods but still demanded plan completion, and 100% efficiency. Attempts to reach the new goals of production proved futile in late 1932. On November 29, in order to complete the plan, Ukraine was to collect 94 million poods, 4.8 of them from sovkhozes. As of January 2, targets were again lowered, to 62.5 million poods. Later that month, on January 14,the targets were lowered even further– by 29.4 million poods, to 33.1 million. Vinnytsya, Kiev oblasts and Moldavian SRR had accomplished the lowered 1932 plan for grain procurement, but not for sawing reserves. The total remains for Ukraine was 22.1 million poods. At same time, GPU of Ukraine reported hunger and starvation in the Kiev and Vinnytsia oblasts, and began implementing measures to remedy the situation. By January 29 Kharkovska oblast had also fulfilled the grain collection plan, and reached its target of production. Despite these successes in production, the total amount of grain collected by February 5 was only 255 million poods—compared to 440 million poods in 1931—while the numbers of “hunger and malnutrition cases,” as registered by the GPU of Ukrainian SSR, increased every day, particularly in in rural areas and small towns. [25]

By early 1932, 69% of households were collectivized.[28] Even though several other regions in the USSR were collectivized to a greater extent,[29] the effect of the collectivization on the Ukrainian agriculture was very substantial.

Collectivization in Ukrainian SSR as of October 1, 1932
Oblast (in late 1932
administrative borders)
of kolhozes
% of peasantry
households collectivization
Kiev Oblast 4053 67.3
Chernihiv Oblast 2332 47.3
Vinnytsia Oblast 3347 58.9
Kharkiv Oblast 4347 72.0
Dnipropetrovsk Oblast 3399 85.1
Odessa Oblast 3594 84.4
Donetsk Oblast 1578 84.4
Moldavian ASSR 620 68.3
Ukrainian SSR 23270 69.0 (77.1% of arable land)

Whilst the long-lasting effect of overall collectivization had an adverse effect on agricultural output everywhere, Ukraine had long been the most agriculturally productive area, providing over 50% of exported grain and 25% of total production of grain in the Russian Empire in 1913. Over 228,936 square kilometres (56.571 million acres), 207,203 km² (51.201 million acres) were used for grain production, or 90.5% of total arable land. This degree of dependency on agriculture meant that the effects of a bad harvest could be almost unlimited. This had been long recognised, and while projections for agricultural production were adjusted, the shock of limited production could not be easily managed. While collections by the state were in turn, limited, there were already clear stresses. The 1932 total Soviet harvest, was to be 29.5 million tons[vague] in state collections of grain out of 90.7 million tons in production. But the actual result was a disastrous 55-60 million tons in production. The state ended up collecting only 18.5 million tons in grain.[30] The total Soviet collections by the state were virtually the same in 1930 and 1931 at about 22.8 million tons. For 1932, they had significantly been reduced to 18.5 million tons; with even lower figure in Ukraine. These were the total estimated outcomes of the grain harvests:[30]

USSR Grain production and collections, 1930–33
(million tons)
Year Production Collections Remainder Collections as
% of production
1930 73-77 22.1 51-55 30.2-28.7
1931 57-65 22.8 34-43 40-35.1
1932 55-60 18.5 36.5-41.5 33.6-30.8
1933 70-77 22.7 47.3-54.3 32.4-29.5
Ukrainian SSR Grain production and collections, 1927–33 (million tons)
Year Production Collections
1927 18.67 0.83 centralized collection only
1928 13.88 1.44
1929 18.7 4.56
1930 22.72 6.92
1931 18.34 7.39
1932 14.65 4.28
1933 22.29 (including sorgo) 5.98

Procurement practice

In 1928, a “by contract” policy of procurement (contracts for the delivery of agricultural products) was implemented for kolkhozes and ordinary peasants alike (“kulaks” had a “firm” plan for procurement) . Accordingly, from 1928 through January 1933, “grain production areas” were required to submit 1/3–1/4 of their estimated yield, while areas designated as “grain” were required to submit no more than 1/8 of their estimated yield. However, between the Autumn of 1930 and the Spring of 1932, local authorities tended to collect products from kolkhozes in amounts greater than the minimum required in order to exceed the contracted target (in some cases by more than 200%). Especially harmful methods utilized in the “by contract” policy were “counterplan” actions, which were additional collection plans implemented in already fulfilled contracts. Such “counterplan” measures were strictly forbidden after the Spring of 1933 as “extremely harmful for kolkhoz development.”[31]

In 1932 a “1/4 of yield” procurement quota for “grain production areas” of the Ukrainian SSR were planned for implementation. On September 23, 1932, a telegram signed by Molotov and Stalin noted that the harvest of 1932 was “satisfactory”, according to estimates provided by the agricultural planning authorities, and therefore requests for seed for winter crops were refused while total winter-tillage acreage demands were increased.[32] Later, Stalin blamed the statistical and planning authorities for inaccurately estimating potential yields and thus a “Commissions for yield estimation” was created on December 17, 1932 by his order.[33] Some modern historians also agree that the 1932 harvest figures provided at the time were largely overestimated and the actual difference between estimated and actual harvest was significant. Such unrealistic figures resulted in demand that was impossibly to fulfill and resulted in lesser reduction of grain procurement plan and greater grain procurement then were possible in late 1932 through the February 5, 1933[34]

Legislation provisions


Law “On the safekeeping of Socialist property” text 12 of August 1932

On August 7, 1932, the Soviet government passed a law “on the safekeeping of Socialist property”[35] that imposed from a ten year prison sentence to the death penalty for any theft of socialist property.[36][37][38][35] Stalin personally appended the stipulation: “People who encroach on socialist property should be considered enemies of the people.”[citation needed] Within five months after passage of the law, 54,645 individuals were sentenced under its provisions, of which, 2,110 were sentenced to death. The initial wording of the Decree “On fought with speculation” adopted August 22 1932 lead to common situations where acts by minor such as bartering tobacco for bread were documented as punished by 5 years imprisonment .[35]; After 1934,by NKVD demand, the penalty for minor offenses was limited to a fine of 500 rubles or 3 month of correctional labor. [26]

The scope of this law, colloquially dubbed the “law of the wheat ears,”[35] included even the smallest appropriation of grain by peasants for personal use. In little over a month the law was revised, as Politburo protocols revealed that secret decisions had later modified the original decree of September 16, 1932. The Politburo approved a measure that specifically exempted small-scale theft of socialist property from the death penalty declaring that “organizations and groupings destroying state, social, and co-operate property in an organized manner by fires, explosions and mass destruction of property shall be sentenced to execution without trial”, and listed a number of cases in which “kulaks, former traders and other socially-alien persons” would be subject to the death penalty. “Working individual peasants and collective farmers” who stole kolkhoz property and grain should be sentenced to ten years; the death penalty should be imposed only for “systematic theft of grain, sugar beets, animals, etc.”[39]

Soviet expectations for the 1932 grain crop were high because of Ukraine’s bumper crop the previous year, which Soviet authorities believed were sustainable. When it became clear that the 1932 grain deliveries were not going to meet the expectations of the government, the decreased agricultural output was blamed on the “kulaks“, and later to agents and spies of foreign Intelligence Services – “nationalists”, and “Petlurovites” and from 1937 on trotskists. According to a report of the head of the Supreme Court, by January 15, 1933 as many as 103,000 people (more than 14 thousand in Ukrainian SSR) had been sentenced under the provisions of the August 7 decree. Of the 79,000 whose sentences were known to the Supreme Court, 4,880 had been sentenced to death, 26,086 to ten years’ imprisonment and 48,094 to other sentences.[39]

On November 2, Sheboldaev (Northern Caucasus regional secretary, formerly of the Lower Volga) declared: “Repression must be taken to the limit, so that they will not mock us for our impotence.[40] A special commission headed by Vyacheslav Molotov was sent to Ukraine in order to execute the grain contingent.[41] On November 8, Molotov and Stalin issued an order stating “from today the dispatch of goods for the villages of all regions of Ukraine shall cease until kolkhozy and individual peasants begin to honestly and conscientiously fulfill their duty to the working class and the Red Army by delivering grain.”[42] On November 9, a secret decree urged the Soviet security agencies to increase their “effectiveness”. Molotov also ordered that if no grain remained in Ukrainian villages, all beets, potatoes, vegetables and any other food were to be confiscated.[citation needed]

On November 24, the Politburo instructed that all those sentenced to confinement of three years or more in Ukraine be deported to labor camps. It also simplified procedures for confirming death sentences in Ukraine. The Politburo also dispatched Balitsky to Ukraine for six months with the full powers of the OGPU.[43]

The existed practice of administrative punishment known as “black board” (black list) by the November, 18 Decree of Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine was applied to a greater extent and with more harsh methods to selected villages and kolkhozes that were considered to be “underperforming” in the grain collection procurement: “Immediate cessation of delivery of goods, complete suspension of cooperative and state trade in the villages, and removal of all available goods from cooperative and state stores”. Full prohibition of collective farm trade for both collective farms and collective farmers, and for private farmers. Cessation of any sort of credit and demand for early repayment of credit and other financial obligations.” [44][45] Initially such sanctions were applied to only 6 villages, but later they were applied to numerous rural settlements and districts. For peasants, who were not kolkhoz members and who were “underperforming” in the grain collection procurement,- special “measures” were adopted. To “reach the grain procurement quota” amongst peasants 1100 brigades were organized which consisted of activists (often from neighboring villages) which had accomplished their grain procurement quota or were close to accomplishing it. Since most of goods supplied to the rural areas was commercial (fabrics, matches, fuels) and was sometimes obtained by villagers from neighbored cities or railway stations, sanctioned villages remained for a long period – as an example mentioned in December 6 Decree the village of Kamyani Potoky was removed from blacklist only October 17, 1933 when they completed their plan for grain collection early. Since January 1933 the black list regime was “softened” when 100% of plan execution was no longer demanded, mentioned in December 6 Decree villages Liutenky and Havrylivka were removed from the black list after 88 and 70% of plan completion respectively. [27]

Measures were undertaken to persecute those withholding or bargaining grain. This was done frequently by requisition detachments, which raided farms to collect grain, and was done regardless of whether the peasants retained enough grain to feed themselves, or whether they had enough seed left to plant the next harvest.

Restrictions on freedom of movement

Street in Kharkiv, 1932

Street in Kharkiv, 1932

Special barricades were set up by GPU units throughout the USSR to prevent an exodus of peasants from the hunger-stricken regions. During a single month in 1933, 219,460 people were intercepted and escorted back or arrested and sentenced.[46]. In Ukraine, these measures had the following results, according to the declassified documents [28][29] [30] [31] during the 11 days (23 January2 February) after the January 22, 1933 Decree 3861 people were intercepted of which 340 were arrested “for further recognition”. During the same period, in trains and at railway stations on the whole Ukrainian territory, there were 16,773 people intercepted (907 of those not living in Ukraine); out of those, 1,610 people were arrested. Such figures also included criminals. In the same document, the OGPU informed about the number of peasants which already had left the Ukrainian territory (94,433 persons) during the period from December 15, 1932 to January 2, 1933 (data for 215 districts out of 484, and Moldavian ASRR).

The government introduced new identity papers and obligatory registration for citizens in December 1932.[46] Initially, the area of new identity papers and obligatory registration implementation were limited to Moscow and Leningrad (encircling 100 km ) and Kharkiv (encircling 50 km) and the wen measures were planned for implementation by June 1933.

Ukrainian SRR railways traffic. Note the density of passenger traffic in 1932. Same situation for sea and river passenger traffic for 1932

Ukrainian SRR railways traffic. Note the density of passenger traffic in 1932. Same situation for sea and river passenger traffic for 1932

Travel from Ukraine and the Northern Caucasus (Kuban) kray (region) was specifically forbidden by directives of January 22, 1933 (signed by Molotov and Stalin) and of January 23, 1933 (joint directive VKP(b) Central Committee and Sovnarkom). The directives stated that the travels “for bread” from these areas were organized by enemies of the Soviet power with the purpose of agitation in northern areas of the USSR against kolkhozes, same as it happened last year (1932) from Ukraine, but were not prevented. Therefore, railway tickets were to be sold only by ispolkom permits, and those who already reached the north should be arrested.[47]

Information blockade

On February 23, 1933 Politburo of VKP(b) Central Committee adopted a decree “About foreign journalists travel trough USSR” which expected what they can be travel and reside in mentioned areas only after approval and obtained a permit from General Directorate of Militia”. The Soviet government denied initial reports of the famine (but agreed with information about malnutrition) , and prevented foreign journalists from traveling in the region. At the same time there was no credible evidence of information blockade arrangements on a considerable number of foreign specialists (engineers, workers, etc) which engaged at many construction site at Ukrainian territory.

For example Mr. Gareth Jones, one of Mr. Lloyd George’s private secretaries spent several days in mid-March in travel “all twenty villages, not only in the Ukraine, but also in the black earth district, and in the Moscow region, and that I slept in peasants’ cottages, and did not immediately leave for the next village”. He easily reached neighboring rural areas of capital of Soviet Ukraine – Kharkov, spent some days there and despite what he has not “saw in the villages no dead human beings nor animals” this journalist who never before saw a famine evidence, reported “that there was famine in the Soviet Union” (actually increasing of death rate from starvation wider affected Kharkov Oblasts in mid April-begin of June 1933).

On August 23, 1933 foreign correspondents were warned individually by the press section of the Foreign Office of USSR not to attempt to travel to the provinces or elsewhere in the Soviet Union without first obtaining formal permission. Foreign Office of USSR without explanation refused permission to William H. Chamberlain, Christian Science Monitor correspondent, to visit and observe the harvest in the principal agricultural regions of the North Caucasus and Ukraine. Several months (May-July 1933) ago two other American correspondents were forbidden to make a trip to Ukraine. [32] Such restriction was softened since September 1933.

Scholars who have conducted research in declassified archives have reported[48] “the Politburo and regional Party committees insisted that immediate and decisive action be taken in response to the famine such that ‘conscientious farmers’ not suffer, while district Party committees were instructed to supply every child with milk and decreed that those who failed to mobilize resources to feed the hungry or denied hospitalization to famine victims be prosecuted.”

Based on data collected by undercover investigation and photos, the BohemianAustrian Catholic Theodor Cardinal Innitzer by the end of 1933 made campaigns of awareness in the West about the massive deaths by hunger and even cases of cannibalism that were occurring in Ukraine and the North Caucasus at that time.[49]

Insufficient assistance

Passers-by no longer pay attention to the corpses of starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933

Passers-by no longer pay attention to the corpses of starved peasants on a street in Kharkiv, 1933

First reports about difficulties with food (malnutrition, hunger) in rural areas and same situation in towns (which undersupplied through rationing system) from Ukrainian GPU and Oblasts Authorities referred to beginning, mid-January 1933. “Measures to localize the cases” predominantly based on locally available resources. While the numbers of such reports and areas mentioned in them increased (as also a quantity of food requested ) Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine issued a February,8 1933 Decree which urged what every “hunger case” should be treated without delay and with maximum mobilization of own resources of kolkhozes, rayons, towns, and oblasts”. Also that decree demanded “within 7 days term” an information about food aid which should be provided from “central sources”. As of February 20, 1933 Dnipropetrovska oblast – reported as most affected – received 1.2 million of poods of food aid, Odeska – 0.8 million, Kharkovska – 0.3 million accordingly to the Order of Central Committee of VKP (b). For Kievska oblast by March, 18 Decree of VKP (b) was allocated 6 million of poods. Ukrainian Authorities also provide the aid but it was limited to resources available. In order to preserve orphaned and affected by hunger children Ukrainian GPU and Peoples Commissariat of Heals created special commission; was established a kindergartens network were children should get an additional food (sugar, oils, products from grain), specially directed for him from Central Ukrainian and Soviet authorities. Urban areas also significantly affected by shortage food supplied predominantly through of rationing system. March 20, 1933 Stalin sign a decree which lowered the monthly milling levy for Ukraine by 14 thousand tons, which amount should be redistributed as additional bread supply “for students, small towns and small enterprises in big cities and specially in Kiev”.

However food aid distribution was not relevantly managed and redistributed by regional and local authorities, even not spoken about differences in amount required and amount provided.

Overturning the first wave of hunger in February – March Ukrainian authorities met with second even worst wave of hunger in starvation in April- May – especially in Kiev and Kharkiv oblasts (delayed winter also add additional casts to that regions situation.)

Between February and June 1933, at least thirty-five Politburo decisions and Sovnarkom decrees selectively authorized issue of a total of 35.19 million poods (576,400 tonnes) [50]or more than half of total aid to whole Soviet agriculture – 1.1 million ton provided by Central soviet Authorities in winter-spring 1933 – of grain for food, seeds and forage for Ukrainian SSR peasants, kolhozes and sovhozes. Such figures do not include grain and flour aid provided for urban population, children and aid from local sources. Stalin personally authorized distribution of aid in the case of a request by Sholokhov, whose own district was stricken.[51] However, Stalin also reprimanded Sholokhov for failing to recognize “sabotage” within his district. This was the only instance that a specific amount of aid was given a specific district.[51] Other appeals were not as successful and many desperate pleas were cut back or rejected.[52]

Documents from the Soviet archives indicate that the aid distribution was made selectively to the most affected areas and from the spring months such assistance has the goal of the relief effort at sowing time was targeted to recovering patients. A special resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine for the Kiev Oblast, from March 31, 1933, ordered dividing peasants hospitalized into ailing and recovering patients. The resolution ordered improving the nutrition of the latter within the limits of available resources so that they could be sent out into the fields to sow the new crop as soon as possible.[53] The food was dispensed according to special resolutions from the government bodies, and additional food was given in the field where the laborers worked.

Export of grain

Export and import of goods Via Ukrainian commercial ports 1913.1928-1933

Export and import of goods Via Ukrainian commercial ports 1913.1928-1933

After recognition of the famine situation in Ukraine during the drought and poor harvests, the Soviet government in Moscow continued to export grain rather than retain its crop to feed the people,[54] even though on a significantly lower level than in previous years. In 1930–31 there had been 5,832,000 tons[vague] of grains exported In 1931–32, grain exports declined to 4,786,000 tons. In 1932–33, grain exports were just 1,607,000 tons and in 1933–34, this further declined to 1,441,000 tons.[55] Officially published data [56] slightly differ

Cereals : 1930 – 4,846,024;
1931 – 5,182,835; 1932 – 1,819,114 (first half of 1932 – approx 750 000, from late April grain also imported – approx. 157,000 tonnes ); 1933 – 1,771,364 tonnes (first half of 1933 – 220 000 [57], late March grain also imported[58]).

From that wheat: 1930 – 2,530,953; 1931 – 2,498,958 ; 1932 – 550,917; 1933 – 748,248 tons. Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were exported (thousand tons): 988.3 -grains, 16,5 other types of cereals; in 1933 – 809.6,-grains 2.6 -cereals; 3.5 meat, 0.4- butter, 2.5 – fish.

Via Ukrainian commercial ports in 1932 were imported (thousand tons): 1932 – no more than 67.2 of grains and cereals 1933 – 8.6 of grains.

Received from other Soviet ports – 1932 (thousand tons): 164 – grains, 7.3 – other types of cereals, fish -31.5 and no more than 177 thousand tons of meat and butter 1933- 230 – grains, 15.3 other types of cereals 0.1 – meat , 0.9- butter, fish – 34.3.

Natural reasons

Ukrainian SSR fallow land
and winter tillage
put into service
(thousands hectares)
Year Fallow land Winter tillage
1932 603.4 3069.7
1933 1581.0 4338.5
1934 2312.2 8358.8

Drought began to be mentioned as the major reason of Holodomor by Soviet propaganda sources since 1983.[59][60] This explanation has been supported by several Western historians.[14] However, the drought was not as bad as that of the non-famine year of 1936, and it was centered outside Ukraine, according to the leading Soviet authority on drought.[61] Nevertheless, there was a significant drought in 1931, which caused a considerable decrease in the harvest, while in 1936 the decrease in the harvest was not as catastrophic.

Sovkhozes general fault of 1932

Ukrainian SRR Sovkhozes delivery of meat, milk and eggs in 1932-34

Ukrainian SRR Sovkhozes delivery of meat, milk and eggs in 1932-34

After grain collection difficulties in 1927 and 1928, Stalin ordered the creation of state grain and meat enterprises – sovkhozes – which, accordingly to his initial vision, should deliver more then 100 million of poods of grain in 1932. However, in 1932 their production results were disastrous because of poor general and agricultural management and planning, despite the significant (as compared to kolkhozes) amount of modern agricultural mechanisms (agricultural tractors, harvesters, etc) employed.[62] But the biggest reason was that they continually seed wheat from 1929 on the same areas and even without fertilizers. Sovkhozes also suffered from a lack of manpower and infrastructure (roads, elevators etc). Losses during harvesting were extremely high.[63] Thus despite an expected 290 millions of poods (more than 5 million tons) in 1932, sovkhozes produced 5 time less, while the situation with livestock was even worse. [64] As of July 20 1932 sovhozes of the Ukrainian SRR had only logged a mere 16% of the defined sawing area.

Primitive agriculture

Another factor in the decline of the harvests were the shortage of drought power for ploughing and reaping was even more acute in 1932 than in the previous year. The number of working horses declined from 19.5 million on July 1, 1931 to 16.2 million on July 1, 1932. The desperate efforts to replace horses by tractors failed to compensate for this loss. In 1931, the total supply of tractors to agriculture amounted to 964,000 hp, 393,000 produced at home and 578,000 imported. But in 1932, because of the foreign trade crisis and home producing establishing, no tractors at all were imported.[65]

Number of tractors
in Ukrainian SSR
(pcs by end of the year)
Year Tractors H.P.
1929–30 15,112 160,500
1931 26,051 321,097
1932 39,089 514,259
1933 51,320 720,094
1934 64,516 933,300

In the whole of 1932, only 679,000 tractor horsepower was supplied to agriculture, considerably less than in 1931. Only about half became available in time for the harvest, and even less in time for the spring sowing. Animal drought power deteriorated in quality. Horses were fed and maintained even more inadequately than in the previous year.[65] The acute shortage of horses led to the notorious decision to employ cows as working animals. According to the speech of one Soviet official at one of the most affected by famine region, the Dnipropetrovsk Oblast “in 1932 we employ only 9000 cows, but in 1933 we involve at least 3/4 of their total number; 57000 employed at sowing.”[33] February 23, the Lower Volga party bureau decided to use 200,000 cows for special field work.

Estimated loss of life

See also: Soviet Census (1937)

While the course of the events as well as their underlying reasons are still a matter of debate, the fact that by the end of 1933, millions of people had starved to death or had otherwise died unnaturally in Ukraine, as well as in other Soviet republics, is undisputed.

The Soviet Union long denied that the famine had ever existed, and the NKVD (and later KGB) archives on the Holodomor period opened very slowly. The exact number of the victims remains unknown and probably impossible to find out even within a margin of error of a hundred thousand.[66]

Limestone Press, 1988, ISBN 0919642314

Rate of population decline in Ukraine and South Russia. 1929-1933 according to “The Foreign Office and the famine : British documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933”, edited by Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Y. Luciuk and Bohdan S. Kordan; Kingston, Ont. ; Vestal, N.Y. : Limestone Press, 1988, ISBN 0919642314

The estimates for the number of deaths due to famine in Ukraine (excluding other repressions) vary by several millions and numbers as high as seven to ten million is sometimes given in the media[67][68][69] and a number as high as 10[70] or even twenty million is sometimes cited in political speeches.[71]

The estimate of ten million deaths, which is attributed to have been circulated from within Soviet official sources[citation needed] is likely based on a misinterpretation of the memoirs of Winston Churchill who gave an account of his conversation with Stalin that took place on August 16, 1942.[3] In that conversation,[72] Stalin gave Churchill his estimates of the number of “kulaks” who were repressed for resisting collectivization as 10 million, in all of the Soviet Union, rather than only in Ukraine. When using this number, Stalin implied that it included not only those who lost their lives, but also forcibly deported.[3]

Even the results based on scientific methods obtained prior to the opening of former Soviet archives also varied widely but the range was somewhat more narrow: 2.5 million (Volodymyr Kubiyovych),[3] 4.8 million (Vasyl Hryshko)[3] and 5 million (Robert Conquest).[59]

One modern calculation that uses demographic data including that available from formerly closed Soviet archives narrows the losses to about 3.2 million or, allowing for the lack of the data precision, 3 million to 3.5 million.[3][73][74][75]

Incidence of Disease in Russian Empire and USSR
Year Typhus Typhoid Fever Relapsing Fever Smallpox Malaria
1913 120 424 30 67 3600
1918-22 1300 293 639 106 2940(average)
1929 40 170 6 8 3000
1930 60 190 5 10 2700
1931 80 260 4 30 3200
1932 220 300 12 80 4500
1933 800 210 12 38 6500
1934 410 200 10 16 9477
1935 120 140 6 4 9924
1936 100 120 3 0.5 6500

The formerly closed Soviet archives show that excess deaths in Ukraine in 1932-1933 numbered 1.54 million.[76] In 1932-1933, there were a combined 1.2 million cases of typhus and 500,000 cases of typhoid fever. Deaths resulted primarily from manifold diseases due to lowered resistance and disease in general rather than actual starvation.[77] All major types of disease, apart from cancer, tend to increase during famine as a result of undernourishment resulting in lower resistance to disease, and of unsanitary conditions. In the years 1932–34, the largest rate of increase was recorded for typhus. Typhus is spread by lice. In conditions of harvest failure and increased poverty, the number of lice is likely to increase, and the herding of refugees at railway stations, on trains and elsewhere facilitates their spread. In 1933, the number of recorded cases was twenty times the 1929 level. The number of cases per head of population recorded in Ukraine in 1933 was naturally considerably higher than in the USSR as a whole. But by June of 1933, incidence in Ukraine had increased to nearly ten times the January level and was higher than in the rest of the USSR taken as a whole.[78]

However, it is important to note that the number of the recorded excess deaths extracted from the birth/death statistics from the Soviet archives is self-contradictory and cannot be fully relied upon because the data fails to add up to the differences between the results of the 1927 Census and the 1937 Census.[3]

Stanislav Kulchytsky summarizes natural population change.[3] The declassified Soviet statistics show a decrease of 538,000 people in the population of Soviet Ukraine between 1926 census (28,925,976) and 1937 census (28,388,000). The number of births and deaths (in thousands) according to the declassified records are given in the table (right).

Declassified Soviet statistics[3]
Year Births Deaths Natural change
1927 1184 523 661
1928 1139 496 643
1929 1081 539 542
1930 1023 536 487
1931 975 515 460
1932 982 668 314
1933 471 1850 -1379
1934 571 483 88
1935 759 342 417
1936 895 361 534

According to the correction for officially non-accounted child mortality in 1933[79] by 150,000 calculated by Sergei Maksudov, the number of births for 1933 should be increased from 471,000 to 621,000. Assuming the natural mortality rates in 1933 to be equal to the average annual mortality rate in 1927-1930 (524,000 per year) a natural population growth for 1933 would have been 97,000, which is five times less than this number in the past years (1927-1930). From the corrected birth rate and the estimated natural death rate for 1933 as well as from the official data for other years the natural population growth from 1927 to 1936 gives 4.043 million while the census data showed a decrease of 538,000. The sum of the two numbers gives an estimated total demographic loss of 4.581 million people. A major hurdle in estimating the human losses due to famine is the needed to take into account the numbers involved in migration (including forced resettlement). According to the Soviet statistics, the migration balance for the population in Ukraine for 1927 – 1936 period was a loss of 1.343 million people. Even at the time when the data was taken, the Soviet statistical institutions acknowledged that its precision was worse than the data for the natural population change. Still, with the correction for this number, the total number of death in Ukraine due to unnatural causes for the given ten years was 3.238 million, and taking into account the lack of precision, especially of the migration estimate, the human toll is estimated between 3 million and 3.5 million.

In addition to the direct losses from unnatural deaths, the indirect losses due to the decrease of the birth rate should be taken into account in consideration in estimating of the demographic consequences of the Famine for Ukraine. For instance, the natural population growth in 1927 was 662,000, while in 1933 it was 97,000, in 1934 it was 88,000. The combination of direct and indirect losses from Holodomor gives 4.469 million, of which 3.238 million (or more realistically 3 to 3.5 million) is the number of the direct deaths according to this estimate.

A 2002 study by Vallin et al[2] utilizing similar primary sources to Kulchytsky, and performing an analysis with more sophisticated demographic tools with forward projection of expected growth from the 1926 census and backward projection from the 1939 census estimate the amount of direct deaths as the result of the 1932-33 famine about 2.6 million. This number of direct deaths from famine does not reflect the total demographic loss for Ukraine from these events as the fall of the birth rate during crisis and the out-migration contribute to the latter as well. The total population shortfall from the expected value between 1926 and 1939 estimated by Vallin amounted to 4.566 million. Of this number, 1.057 million is attributed to birth deficit, 930,000 to forced out-migration, and 2.582 million to excess mortality and voluntary out-migration. With the latter assumed to be negligible this estimate gives the number of direct deaths as the result of the 1932-33 famine about 2.6 million. According to this study the life expectancy for those born in 1933 sharply fell to 10.8 years for females and to 7.3 years for males and remained abnormally low for 1934 but, as commonly expected for the post-crisis peaked in 1935–36.[2]

According to estimates[79] about 81.3% of the victims were ethnic Ukrainians, 4.5% Russians, 1.4% Jews and 1.1% were Poles. Many Belarusians, Hungarians, Volga Germans and Crimean Tatars became victims as well. The Ukrainian rural population was the hardest hit by the Holodomor. Since the peasantry constituted a demographic backbone of the Ukrainian nation,[80] the tragedy deeply affected the Ukrainians for many years.

Elimination of Ukrainian cultural elite

The famine of 1932-1933 followed the assault on Ukrainian national culture that started in 1928.[citation needed] The events of 1932-1933 in Ukraine were seen by the Soviet Communist leaders as an instrument against Ukrainian self-determination. At the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Moscow-appointed leader Pavel Postyshev declared that “1933 was the year of the defeat of Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution.”[81] This “defeat” encompassed not just the physical extermination of a significant portion of the Ukrainian peasantry, but also the virtual elimination of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church clergy and the mass imprisonment or execution of Ukrainian intellectuals, writers and artists.

By the end of the 1930s, approximately four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural elite had been “eliminated”.[82] Some, like Ukrainian writer Mykola Khvylovy, committed suicide. One of the leading Ukrainian Bolsheviks, Mykola Skrypnyk, who was in charge of the decade-long Ukrainization program that had been decisively brought to an end, shot himself in the summer of 1933 at the height of the terrifying purge of the CP(b)U. The Communist Party of Ukraine, under the guidance of state officials like Kaganovich, Kosior, and Pavel Postyshev, boasted in early 1934 of the elimination of “counter-revolutionaries, nationalists, spies and class enemies”. Whole academic organizations, such as the Bahaliy Institute of History and Culture, were shut down following the arrests.

Monument to the murdered kobzars in Kharkiv

Monument to the murdered kobzars in Kharkiv

In the 1920s, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) had gained a significant following amongst the Ukrainian peasants due to the Soviet policy of weakening the position of the Russian Orthodox Church (see History of Christianity in Ukraine). Nonetheless, in the late 1920s the Soviet authorities closed thousands of parishes and repressed the clergy of the Ukrainian Orthodox church. By 1930 the church was taken off the Soviet Registry and the NKVD made sure that it did not exist unofficially.

Ukrainian music ensembles had their repertoires severely restricted and censored. Foreign tours by Ukrainian artists were canceled without explanation. Many artists were arrested and detained often for months at a time without cause. After not receiving any pay for many months, many choirs and artistic ensembles such as the Kiev and Poltava Bandurist Capellas ceased to exist. Blind traditional folk musicians known as kobzars were summoned from all of Ukraine to an ethnographic conference and disappeared (See Persecuted bandurists).

Repression of the intelligentsia occurred in virtually all parts of the USSR.[83] Despite the assault, education and publishing in the republic remained Ukrainianized for the years to come. In 1935-36, 83% of all school children in the Ukrainian SSR were taught in Ukrainian even though Ukrainians made up about 80% of the population.[84] In 1936 from 1830 newspapers 1402 were in Ukrainian, as were 177 magazines, in 1936 69 104 thousand Ukrainian books were printed.[85]

Was the Holodomor genocide?

Robert Conquest, the author of a Western study published prior to the declassification of the Soviet archives, concluded that the famine of 1932–33 was a deliberate act of mass murder, if not genocide committed as part of Joseph Stalin‘s collectivization program in the Soviet Union. In 2006, the Security Service of Ukraine declassified more than 5 thousand pages of Holodomor archives.[86] These documents suggest that the Soviet Regime singled out Ukraine, while regions outside it were allowed to receive humanitarian aid.[87]

Some historians maintain, however, that the famine was an unintentional consequence of collectivization, and that the associated resistance to it by the Ukrainian peasantry exacerbated an already-poor harvest.[88] Some researchers state that while the term Ukrainian Genocide is often used in application to the event, technically, the use of the term “genocide” is inapplicable.[10] They argue that since the Holodomor did not affect cities[citation needed], and was limited to rural areas of Ukraine, it is not plausible to argue that the government tried to destroy the Ukrainian people as such. It has been suggested that the Holodomor be classified not as genocide, but as democide.[citation needed]

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, laureate of the Nobel Prize in Literature, opined in Izvestia that Holodomor was no different from the Russian famine of 1921 as both were caused by the ruthless robbery of peasants by Bolshevik grain procurements. According to him the lie of the Holodomor being genocide was invented decades later after the event and Ukrainian efforts to have the famine recognised as genocide is an act of historical revisionism that has now surpassed the level of Bolshevik agitprop. The writer cautions that the genocidal claim has its chances to be accepted by the West due to the general western ignorance of Russian and Ukrainian history.[89]

Politicization of Holodomor

The originator of the term “genocide“, Raphael Lemkin, was a featured speaker at the manifestation of Ukrainian-Americans in September, 1953 to mark the twentieth anniversary of the Ukrainian Famine.[10] The heads of state, governments or parliaments of countries including Ukraine, Argentina, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the Czech Republic,[90] Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Moldova, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Spain, United States, and Vatican City, consider the 1932–1933 famine as an act of genocide. Scholars have documented that the Soviet famine of 1932-33 affected other nationalities. The 2004 book The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 by R.W. Davies and S.G. Wheatcroft gives an estimate of around 5.5 to 6.5 million deaths in the 1932–1933 famine throughout the Soviet Union.[91] Still, the Holodomor remains a politically-charged topic.

The term democide, introduced by the academic R.J. Rummel, is “the murder of any person or people by a government, including genocide, politicide, and mass murder“.[92] One view claims that the famine primarily affected the rural population of Ukraine. However, in 1932, 75% to 85% of Ukrainians resided in villages.[93]

According to the US Government Commission on the Ukrainian Famine,[94] the seizure of the 1932 crop by the Soviet authorities was the main reason for the famine. The US commission stated that “while famine took place during the 1932-1933 agricultural year in the Volga Basin and the North Caucasus Territory as a whole, the invasiveness of Stalin’s interventions of both the Fall of 1932 and January 1933 in Ukraine are paralleled only in the ethnically Ukrainian Kuban region of the North Caucasus”. Ons should take into consideration that at that time 80% of the Ukrainian urban population in both Soviet and Western Ukraine was non-Ukrainian, while the rural population, most strongly affected by the Holodomor, had an ethnic Ukrainian majority.

At the international conference of the Ukrainian Holodomor, which was held in October 2003 at the Institute of Social and Religious History of Vicenza, 28 conference participants that included the well-respected historians like James Mace, Hubert Laszkiewicz, Andrea Graziosi, Yuriy Shapoval, Gerhard Simon, Orest Subtelny, Mauro Martini, etc. – endorsed a resolution addressed to the Italian government and the European Parliament with a request to recognize the Holodomor as an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.[95][96]

One of the interpretations of

One of the interpretations of “The Running Man” painting by Kazimir Malevich is an authors’ indictment of the Great Famine.[97] “Kasimir Malevich’s haunting ‘The Running Man’ (1933-34), showing a peasant fleeing across a deserted landscape, is eloquent testimony to the disaster.”[98]

On May 15, 2003, the Verkhovna Rada (parliament) of Ukraine also passed a resolution declaring the famine of 1932–1933 an act of genocide, deliberately organized by the Soviet government against the Ukrainian nation.[citation needed] On November 26, 2006 the Ukrainian Parliament approved a bill, according to which the Soviet-era forced famine was an act of genocide against the Ukrainian people.[99]

In November of 2007, the Ukrainian parliament tabled a bill that would have outlawed denial of the Holodomor as genocide.

Governments and parliaments of several of other countries[16] have also officially recognized the Holodomor as an act of genocide.[6][7][8][9][100]

At the conference on “Recognition and Denial of Genocide and Mass Killing in the 20th Century,” held at City University of New York on 13 November 1987, it was stated that Soviet Ukraine suffered a man-made famine in 1932–1933, during which millions died. As the United States Government Commission concluded this was part of the central governments’s attack on Ukrainian nationality and culture. The United States Government received numerous contemporary intelligence reports on the famine from its European embassies, but chose not to acknowledge the famine publicly. Similarly, leading members of the American press corps in the Soviet Union willfully covered up the famine in their dispatches. In both cases, political considerations relating to the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. seem to have been critical factors in this cover-up.[101]

The Russian Federation officially says that the Holodomor not an ethnic genocide and the State Duma passed a resolution on the subject in 2008 saying it should not be considered genocide – “There is no historical proof that the famine was organized along ethnic lines. Its victims were million of citizens of the Soviet Union, representing different peoples and nationalities living largely in agricultural areas of the country,” the Russian State Duma resolution said.[102] Russian diplomat Mikhail Kamynin has stated that Russia is against the politicisation of the Holodomor, and this question is for historians, not politicians.[103] Simultaneously the vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma, Lyubov Sliska, when asked in Kiev when Russia would apologize for its part in repressions and famines in Ukraine, replied, “why always insist that Russia apologize for everything? The people whose policies brought suffering not only to Ukraine, but to Russia, Belarus, peoples of the Caucasus, and Crimean Tatars, remain only in history textbooks, secret documents and minutes of meetings.”[103] Ukrainian mass media censured Evgeny Guzeev, the Consul-General of the Russian Federation in Lviv, who stated that “the leaders of the period were sensible people, and it is impossible to imagine that this was planned.”[104]

The final report of the “International Commission of Inquiry Into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine“, delivered to the UN Under-Secretary for Human Rights in Geneva on May 9, 1990, concluded that the famine in Ukraine was, in fact, genocide.[105]

A significant step in the world recognition of Holodomor was the Joint declaration at the United Nations in connection with 70th anniversary of the Great Famine in Ukraine 1932-1933 (10 November 2003),[106] evaluating the Holodomor as a great tragedy. According to Valery Kuchinsky, the chief Ukrainian representative at the United Nations the declaration was a compromise between the positions of Great Britain, United States and Russia denying that Holodomor was a genocide and the position of Ukraine that insisted on recognition of Holodomor as a form of genocide.[104]

Comprehending the famine

The famine remains a politically-charged topic; hence, heated debates are likely to continue for a long time. Until around 1990, the debates were largely between the so called “denial camp” who refused to recognize the very existence of the famine or stated that it was caused by natural reasons (such as a poor harvest), scholars who accepted reports of famine but saw it as a policy blunder[107] followed by the botched relief effort, and scholars who alleged that it was intentional and specifically anti-Ukrainian or even an act of genocide against the Ukrainians as a nation.

Nowadays, scholars agree that the famine affected millions. While it is also accepted that the famine affected other nationalities in addition to Ukrainians, the debate is still ongoing as to whether or not the Holodomor qualifies as an act of genocide, since the facts that the famine itself took place and that it was unnatural are not disputed. As far as the possible effect of the natural causes, the debate is restricted to whether the poor harvest[88] or post-traumatic stress played any role at all and to what degree the Soviet actions were caused by the country’s economic and military needs as viewed by the Soviet leadership.[citation needed]

Still, the Holodomor issue is politicized within the framework of uneasy relations between Russia and Ukraine (and also between various regional and social groups within Ukraine). Russian political interests and their supporters in Ukraine have reasons to deny the deliberate character of the disaster and play down its scale.[citation needed]

In 2007, President Viktor Yushchenko declared he wants “a new law criminalising Holodomor denial,” while Communist Party head Petro Symonenko said he “does not believe there was any deliberate starvation at all,” and accused Yushchenko of “using the famine to stir up hatred.”[68] Few in Ukraine share Symonenko’s interpretation of history and the number of Ukrainians who deny the famine or view it as caused by natural reasons is steadily falling.[108].

On November 10, 2003 at the United Nations twenty-five countries including Russia, Ukraine and United States signed a joint statement on the seventieth anniversary of the Holodomor with the following preamble:

In the former Soviet Union millions of men, women and children fell victims to the cruel actions and policies of the totalitarian regime. The Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor), which took from 7 million to 10 million innocent lives and became a national tragedy for the Ukrainian people. In this regard we note activities in observance of the seventieth anniversary of this Famine, in particular organized by the Government of Ukraine.

Honouring the seventieth anniversary of the Ukrainian tragedy, we also commemorate the memory of millions of Russians, Kazakhs and representatives of other nationalities who died of starvation in the Volga River region, Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan and in other parts of the former Soviet Union, as a result of civil war and forced collectivization, leaving deep scars in the consciousness of future generations.[109]

The Ukrainian communities are sometimes criticized for using the term Holodomor, Ukrainian Genocide, or even Ukrainian Holocaust, to appropriate the larger-scale tragedy of collectivization as their own national terror-famine, thus exploiting it for political purposes.[93]

One of the biggest arguments is that the famine was preceded by the onslaught on the Ukrainian national culture, a common historical detail preceding many centralized actions directed against the nations as a whole. Nation-wide, the political repression of 1937 (The Great Purge) under the guidance of Nikolay Yezhov were known for their ferocity and ruthlessness, but Lev Kopelev wrote, “In Ukraine 1937 began in 1933”, referring to the comparatively early beginning of the Soviet crackdown in Ukraine. [110].

While the famine was well documented at the time, its reality has been disputed for ideological reasons, for instance by the Soviet government and its spokespeople (as well as apologists for the Soviet regime), by others due to being deliberately misled by the Soviet government (such as George Bernard Shaw), and, in at least one case, Walter Duranty, for personal gain.

An example of a late-era Holodomor objector is Canadian communist[citation needed] and journalist Douglas Tottle, author of Fraud, Famine and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (published by Moscow-based Soviet publisher Progress Publishers in 1987). Tottle claims that while there were severe economic hardships in Ukraine, the idea of the Holodomor was fabricated as propaganda by Nazi Germany and William Randolph Hearst to justify a German invasion. Tottle is not a professional historian and his revisionist work did not receive any serious attention in the historiography of the subject.


To honor those who perished in the Holodomor, monuments have been dedicated and public events held annually in Ukraine and worldwide. The fourth Saturday in November is the official day of remembrance for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repression.[111]

In 2006, the Holodomor Remembrance Day took place on November 25. President Viktor Yushchenko directed, in decree No. 868/2006, that a minute of silence should be observed at 4 o’clock in the afternoon on that Saturday. The document specified that flags in Ukraine should fly at half-staff as a sign of mourning. In addition, the decree directed that entertainment events are to be restricted and television and radio programming adjusted accordingly.[112]

This year, the 75th anniversary of the Holodomor was commemorated in Kiev for three days on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti. As part of the three day event, from November 23-25th, video testimonies of the communist regime’s crimes in Ukraine, and documentaries by famous domestic and foreign film directors are being shown. Additionally, experts and scholars are scheduled to give lectures on the topic.[113]

On November 17, 2007 members from Aleksandr Dugin‘s radical Russian nationalist group the Eurasian Youth Union broke into the Ukrainian cultural center in Moscow and smashed an exhibition on the famine.[114]

See also


  1. ^ France Meslè et Jacques Vallin avec des contributions de Vladimir Shkolnikov, Serhii Pyrozhkov et Serguei Adamets, Mortalite et cause de dècès en Ukraine au XX siècle p.28, see also France Meslé, Gilles Pison, Jacques Vallin France-Ukraine: Demographic Twins Separated by History, Population and societies, N°413, juin 2005
  2. ^ a b c Jacques Vallin, France Mesle, Serguei Adamets, Serhii Pyrozhkov, A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s, Population Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3. (Nov., 2002), pp. 249-264
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i Stanislav Kulchytsky, “How many of us perished in Holodomor in 1933”, Zerkalo Nedeli, November 23-29, 2002. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
  4. ^ Helen Fawkes, “Legacy of famine divides Ukraine”, BBC News, November 24, 2006
  5. ^ ‘Stalinism’ was a collective responsibility – Kremlin papers, The News in Brief, University of Melbourne, 19 June 1998, Vol 7 No 22
  6. ^ a b United States Commission on the Ukraine Famine, “Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine” [1], Report to Congress, Washington, D.C., April 19, 1988
  7. ^ a b US House of Representatives Authorizes Construction of Ukrainian Genocide Monument
  8. ^ a b Statement by Pope John Paul II on the 70th anniversary of the Famine
  9. ^ a b HR356 “Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the man-made famine that occurred in Ukraine in 1932–1933”, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., October 21, 2003
  10. ^ a b c Yaroslav Bilinsky (1999). “Was the Ukrainian Famine of 1932–1933 Genocide?“. Journal of Genocide Research 1 (2): 147–156.
  11. ^ Dr. David Marples, The great famine debate goes on…, ExpressNews (University of Alberta), originally published in Edmonton Journal, November 30, 2005
  12. ^ Stanislav Kuchytsky, “Holodomor of 1932–1933 as genocide: the gaps in the proof“, Den, February 17, 2007. (Russian)
  13. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky,”Holodomor-33: Why and how?”, Zerkalo Nedeli, November 25December 1. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  14. ^ a b See collection of papers by Mark D. Tauger
  15. ^ R. W. Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931–1933 (The Industrialization of Soviet Russia)”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, ISBN 0-333-31107-8
  16. ^ a b Sources differ on interpreting various statements from different branches of different governments as to whether they amount to the official recognition of the Famine as Genocide by the country. For example, after the statement issued by the Latvian Sejm on March 13, 2008, the total number of countries is given as 19 (according to Ukrainian BBC: “Латвія визнала Голодомор ґеноцидом”), 16 (according to Korrespondent, Russian edition: “После продолжительных дебатов Сейм Латвии признал Голодомор геноцидом украинцев”), “more than 10” (according to Korrespondent, Ukrainian edition: “Латвія визнала Голодомор 1932-33 рр. геноцидом українців”)
  17. ^ Ukrainian holod (голод, ‘hunger’, compare Russian golod) should not be confused with kholod (холод, ‘cold’). For details, see romanization of Ukrainian. Mor means ‘plague’ in the sense of a disastrous evil or affliction, or a sudden unwelcome outbreak. See wiktionary:plague.
  18. ^ Голодомор, in “Velykyi tlumachnyi slovnyk suchasnoi ukrainsʹkoi movy: 170 000 sliv”, chief ed. V. T. Busel, Irpin, Perun (2004), ISBN 9665690132
  19. ^ news.bbc.co.uk
  20. ^ С. Кульчицький, Проблема колективізації сільського господарства в сталінській “революції зверху”, (pdf) Проблеми Історіїї України факти, судження, пошуки, №12, 2004, сс. 21-69
  21. ^ Wheatcroft and Davies
  22. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p.490
  23. ^ Ivnitskyy “Tragedy of Soviet Village”
  24. ^ http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1931.php]
  25. ^ Compendium of Soviet Law for 1931. Moscow, 1932
  26. ^ С.В. Кульчицький, Опір селянства суцільній колективізації, Ukrainian Historical Journal, 2004, № 2, 31-50.
  27. ^ С. Кульчицький, Голодомор-33: сталінський задум та його виконання (pdf), Проблеми Історіїї України факти, судження, пошуки, №15, 2006, сс. 190-264
  28. ^ R. W. Davies, Stephen G. Wheatcroft, “The Years of Hunger: Soviet Agriculture, 1931-1933 (The Industrialization of Soviet Russia)”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, ISBN 0-333-31107-8. p.487
  29. ^ eg. 83% in Lower Volga, Davies and Wheatcroft, ibid
  30. ^ a b Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 448
  31. ^ Soviet Agricultural Encyclopedia 1-st edition 1932-35 Moscow
  32. ^ http://www.archives.gov.ua/Sections/Famine/Publicat/Fam-kolekt-1932.php
  33. ^ Soviet Agricultural Encyclopedia 2-nd edition 1939 Moscow
  34. ^ S. Kulchytskyy. “For assessment of the situation in the agriculture sector of the Ukrainian SSR.” Ukrainian Historical Magazine No. 3, 1988; and also a S. Kulchytskyy letter to the International Commission of Inquiry into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine.
  35. ^ a b c d Konchalovsky and Lipkov, The Inner Circle, Newmarket Press, New York: 1991, p.54
  36. ^ Potocki, p. 320.
  37. ^ Serczyk, p. 311.
  38. ^ Andrew Gregorovich, “Genocide in Ukraine 1933”, part 4: “How Did Stalin Organize the Genocide?”, Ukrainian Canadian Research & Documentation Centre, Toronto 1998.
  39. ^ a b Davies and Wheatcroft, pp.167-168, 198-203
  40. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 176.
  41. ^ Rajca, p. 77.
  42. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 174.
  43. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 175.
  44. ^ Rajca, p. 321.
  45. ^ Memorandum on Grain Problem, Addendum to the minutes of Politburo [meeting] No. 93. Resolution on blacklisting villages. December 1932
  46. ^ a b Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartošek, Jean-Louis Panné, Jean-Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stéphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-674-07608-7
  47. ^ Terry Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939., Ithaca. N.I., 2001, p. 306
  48. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 424
  49. ^ Starvation & Surplus, TIME Magazine, January 22, 1934
  50. ^ Голод 1932-1933 років на Україні: очима істориків, мовою документів
  51. ^ a b On April 6, 1933, Sholokhov, who lived in the Vesenskii district (Kuban, Russian Federation), wrote at length to Stalin, describing the famine conditions and urging him to provide grain. Stalin received the letter on April 15, and on April 16 the Politburo granted 700 tons of grain to the district. Stalin sent a telegram to Sholokhov “We will do everything required. Inform size of necessary help. State a figure.” Sholokhov replied on the same day, and on April 22, the day on which Stalin received the second letter, Stalin scolded him, “You should have sent answer not by letter but by telegram. Time was wasted”. Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 217
  52. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 218
  53. ^ CC C(b)PU resolution cited through Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Why did Stalin exterminate the Ukrainians?“, Den’, 29 November 2005 at same time original document mentioned by Kulchytsky does not have any “distrophy” wording, and was issued for only one region, not all of Ukraine—[2] doc # 204
  54. ^ Encyclopedia of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity – Page 1056 ISBN 0028658485
  55. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p.471
  56. ^ СССР в цифрах ЦУНХУ Госплана СССР. Москва 1935, page 574, 575
  57. ^ Mark B.Tauger Natural Disaster and Human Actions in the Soviet Famine of 1931-33 2001. p.4
  58. ^ СССР в цифрах ЦУНХУ Госплана СССР. Москва 1935, page 585
  59. ^ a b Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine Oxford University Press New York (1986) ISBN 0-195-04054-6
  60. ^ A News Release Communique from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa dated 28 April 1983; see also Harvest of Sorrow by Conquest, page 346.
  61. ^ A.I. Rudenko. Zasukhi v USSR, see also Harvest of sorrow, p. 222
  62. ^ Development of the Ukrainian SRR Economy. Kyiv-1949 Ukrainian Academy of Science publishing
  63. ^ Soviet Agricultural Encyclopedia 2-nd edition 1939 Moscow
  64. ^ Soviet Agricultural Encyclopedia 1-st edition 1932-35 Moscow
  65. ^ a b Davies and Wheatcroft, p.111
  66. ^ Valeriy Soldatenko, “A starved 1933: subjective thoughts on objective processes”, Zerkalo Nedeli, June 28July 4, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
  67. ^ BBC report
  68. ^ a b Laura Sheeter, “Ukraine remembers famine horror”, BBC News, November 24, 2007
  69. ^ The Ukrainian politician Stepan Khmara during the hearings in the Verkhovna Rada (quoted through Kuchytsky): “I would like to address the scientists, particularly, Stanislav Kulchytsky, who attempts to mark down the number of victims and counts them as 3–3.5 million. I studied these questions analyzing the demographic statistics as early as in 1970s and concluded that the number of victims was no less than 7 million”
    Cited through Stalislav Kulchytsky, “Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book” Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in UkrainianHowever, accordingly to Kulchitsky note in his work about Holodomor http://www.history.org.ua/Book/Ki/ p.4 , what demographical data were opened only in late 1980-s, so komsomol secretary responsible for ideology in western Ukrainian region (as Stepan Khmara was) simply have not access to such data in 1970s.
  70. ^ Viktor Yushchenko, “Holodomor”, The Wall Street Journal, 27.11.2007
  71. ^ Ukrainian President Yushchenko: Yushchenko’s Address before Joint Session of U.S. Congress
  72. ^ Valentin Berezhkov, “Kak ya stal perevodchikom Stalina”, Moscow, DEM, 1993, ISBN 5-85207-044-0. p. 317
  73. ^ Stalislav Kulchytsky, “Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine. Through the pages of one almost forgotten book” Zerkalo Nedeli, August 16-22, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  74. ^ Stanislav Kulchytsky, “Reasons of the 1933 famine in Ukraine-2”, Zerkalo Nedeli, October 4-10, 2003. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian
  75. ^ Stalislav Kuchytsky, “Demographic losses in Ukrainian in the twentieth century”, Zerkalo Nedeli, October 2-8, 2004. Available online in Russian and in Ukrainian.
  76. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p.415
  77. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 429
  78. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 512
  79. ^ a b Sergei Maksudov, “Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR 1918–1958”, in The Samizdat Register II, ed R. Medvedev (London–New York 1981)
  80. ^ Robert Potocki, “Polityka państwa polskiego wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w latach 1930-1939” (in Polish, English summary), Lublin 2003, ISBN 83-917615-4-1
  81. ^ “12th Congress of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, Stenograph Record”, Kharkiv 1934.
  82. ^ E.g. Encyclopedia Britannica, “History of Ukraine” article.
  83. ^ Roy Medvedev writes “Instead, Stalin once again looked for a scapegoat and found it in the form of the specialists from among the pre-revolutionary Russian (and Ukrainian) intelligentsia”
    Roy Medvedev, “Let History Judge: The Origins and Consequences of Stalinism”, Columbia University Press, 1989, ISBN 0231063504, p. 256-258.
  84. ^ Ronald Grigor Suny, The Soviet Experiment
  85. ^ “Soviet Ukraine for 20 years” p.102 Ukrainian SRR Academy of Science 1938 Kiev, also same data in Statistical Compendium 1936
  86. ^ [3]
  87. ^ SBU documents show that Moscow singled out Ukraine in famine 5tv – Ukraine Channel Five. 22 November 2006. Retrieved 23 November 2006
  88. ^ a b Tauger 1991 and the acrimonious exchange between Tauger and Conquest.
  89. ^ Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn Поссорить родные народы?? Izvestia 2 April 2008 (Russian)
  90. ^ Podrobnosti
  91. ^ Davies and Wheatcroft, p. 401
  92. ^ Robert J. Rummel, Death by government, New Brunswick, N.J. : Transactions Publishers, 1994, ISBN 1560001453
  93. ^ a b “I am not saying that the famine or the other components of the victimization narratives do not deserve historical research and reflection, nor that evil should be ignored, nor that the memory of the dead should not be held sacred. But I object to instrumentalizing this memory with the aim of generating political and moral capital, particularly when it is linked to an exclusion from historical research and reflection of events in which Ukrainians figured as perpetrators not victims, and when “our own” evil is kept invisible and the memory of the others’ dead is not held sacred.”[4] Himka, John-Paul. “War Criminality: A Blank Spot in the Collective Memory of theUkrainian Diaspora”. Spaces of Identity 5 (1): 5-24.
  94. ^ Findings of the Commission on the Ukraine Famine
  95. ^ “Convegno internazionale di studi La grande carestia, la fame e la morte della terra nell’Ucraina del 1932-33”
  96. ^ “The Great Famine-Genocide in Soviet Ukraine (Holodomor)”
  97. ^ Dmytro Horbachov, Fullest Expression of Pure feeling, Welcome to Ukraine, 1998, No 1.
  98. ^ Andrew Wilson, “The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation”, Yale University Press, 2002, ISBN 0300093098, p.144
  99. ^ Lisova, Natasha. “Ukraine Recognize Famine As Genocide“, The Associated Press, 28.11.2006. Retrieved on 29 November 2006.
  100. ^ Countries whose government recognize Holodomor as Genocide are Argentina [5], Australia [6] [7], Azerbaijan [8], Belgium [9], Canada [10], Estonia [11], Georgia [12], Hungary [13], Italy [14], Latvia [15], Lithuania [16], Moldova [17], Poland [18], United States [19] and the Vatican [20]
  102. ^ Steve Gutterman, Russia: 1930s Famine Was Not Genocide, Associated Press, Apr 2, 2008
  103. ^ a b News Ru Russia owes Ukraine no apologies” thinks vice-speaker of the Duma Released on 5th of December, 2006.
  104. ^ a b Borysov, Dmytro “Russian diplomat denies the Holodomor” Lvivska Hazeta 29.11.2005 [21] (Ukrainian)
  105. ^ International Commission of Inquiry Into the 1932–33 Famine in Ukraine by Prof. Jacob Sundberg
  106. ^ Joint Statement on Holodomor
  107. ^ J. Arch Getty, “The Future Did Not Work”, The Atlantic Monthly, Boston: March 2000, Vol. 285, Iss.3, pg.113
  108. ^ Большинство украинцев считают Голодомор актом геноцида, Korrespondent.net, November 20, 2007
  109. ^ Joint Statement on the Great Famine of 1932-1933 in Ukraine (Holodomor) on Monday, November 10, 2003 at the United Nations in New York
  110. ^ Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,. ISBN 0-80205-808-6.
  111. ^ Bradley, Lara. “Ukraine’s ‘Forced Famine’ Officially Recognized. The Sundbury Star. 3 January 1999. URL Accessed 12 October 2006
  112. ^ Yushchenko, Viktor. Decree No. 868/2006 by President of Ukraine. Regarding the Remembrance Day in 2006 for people who died as a result of Holodomor and political repressions (Ukrainian)
  113. ^ “Ceremonial events to commemorate Holodomor victims to be held in Kiev for three days.” National Radio Company of Ukraine. URL Accessed 25 November 2007
  114. ^ Ukraine Demanding That Russia Punish Eurasian Youth Union Members For Smashing Famine Exhibition In Moscow

External links

Declarations and legal acts

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Books and articles

  • Czesław Rajca (2005). Głód na Ukrainie. Lublin/Toronto: Werset. ISBN 83-60133-04-2.
  • Marco Carynnyk, Lubomyr Luciuk and Bohdan S Kordan, eds, The Foreign Office and the Famine: British Documents on Ukraine and the Great Famine of 1932-1933, foreword by Michael Marrus (Kingston: Limestone Press, 1988)
  • Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine Oxford University Press New York (1987) ISBN 0195051807
  • Robert W. Davies; Wheatcroft, Stephen G., The Years of Hunger. Soviet Agriculture 1931-1933, Houndmills 2004 ISBN 3-412-10105-2
  • Robert W. Davies; Wheatcroft, Stephen G., Stalin and the Soviet Famine of 1932-33 – A Reply to Ellman, in: Europe-Asia Studies Vol. 58 (2006), 4, pp. 625-633.
  • Miron Dolot, EXECUTION BY HUNGER: THE HIDDEN HOLOCAUST, New York: W.W Norton & Company, 1985, xvi + 231 pp. ISBN 0-393-01886-5.
  • Barbara Falk, Sowjetische Städte in der Hungersnot 1932/33. Staatliche Ernährungspolitik und städtisches Alltagsleben (= Beiträge zur Geschichte Osteuropas 38), Köln: Böhlau Verlag 2005 ISBN 3-412-10105-2
  • Wasyl Hryshko, The Ukrainian Holocaust of 1933, (Toronto: 1983, Bahriany Foundation)
  • R. Kusnierz, – Ukraina w latach kolektywizacji i Wielkiego Glodu (1929-1933), Torun, 2005
  • Leonard Leshuk, ed, Days of Famine, Nights of Terror: Firsthand Accounts of Soviet Collectivization, 1928-1934 (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 1995)
  • Lubomyr Luciuk, ed, Not Worthy: Walter Duranty’s Pulitzer Prize and The New York Times (Kingston: Kashtan Press, 2004)
  • Douglas Tottle, Fraud, Famine, and Fascism: The Ukrainian Genocide Myth from Hitler to Harvard (1987)
  • Stephen G. Wheatcroft: Towards Explaining the Soviet Famine of 1931-1933: Political and Natural Factors in Perspective, in: Food and Foodways Vol. 12 (2004), No. 2-3, pp. 104-136.

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